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GONE ROGUE?:
CHINA’S ASSERTIVENESS IN 
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
 Derek Pham
D espite China’s efforts in the past decade to implement a “good neighbor” policy with surrounding states, in the past two years this foreign policy has been seemingly 
compromised by China’s aggressive tactics in the contested South 
China Sea (SCS), including its imposition of unilateral fishing 
bans, arrests of foreign fishermen, and increased coastal patrols. 
China’s supposed private declaration this past March to American 
officials that the South China Sea constituted a “core interest” ap-
peared to affirm a newfound and unconventionally aggressive com-
mitment to the question of sovereignty in the SCS.* This pattern 
of assertiveness was further apparent in China’s vehement response 
to U.S. intervention in the dispute. Media reports attempting to 
interpret the change in posture concluded that there was still much 
uncertainty associated with China’s ascendancy in the internation-
al system.†
Impassioned rhetoric might obscure the more interesting 
question at hand: why has China now chosen to assert its interests 
in the South China Sea through the use of aggressive tactics? For 
the past ten years, China had been remarkably successful in pur-
*  For a comprehensive assessment and refutation of the “core interest” argument, 
see Michael Swaine’s piece for the Carnegie Endowment, “China’s Assertive 
Behavior, Part One: On Core Interests,” China Leadership Monitor 34, Fall 2010. The 
paper argues that changes occurred in the strategic environment, and cites the 
“core interest” statement as perhaps the most notable example. 
†  Extensive media attention has been given to this perceived “new form” of Chinese 
assertiveness. For a select but diverse sample, see Vaudine England, “Why are South 
China Sea tensions rising?” BBC News Asia-Pacific, September 2, 2010;  Peh Shing 
Huei, “Nations eye China’s rise nervously,” The Straits Times, September 30, 2010; 
Joshua Kurlantzick, “A Beijing backlash: China is starting to face consequences for 
its newly aggressive stance,” Newsweek, October 4, 2010.  
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suing a policy of “shelving disputes [and] joint development” with 
the other claimants. As Daniel Blumenthal of Foreign Policy writes: 
“The Chinese were supposed to be using their deep reservoirs of 
‘soft power’ and practicing a highly skilled diplomacy at assuring all 
that China is rising peacefully. But over the past year, Beijing has 
been [clumsy].”1 Other commentators noted that “China’s actions 
in the region have led to unease over what was perceived as its in-
creasing assertiveness, and caused [questions over] its commitment 
to a peaceful rise. [China] took on a menacing visage. Its diplomacy 
seemed reactive rather than proactive.”2 These comments under-
scored a change in the status quo which was highlighted at the July 
2010 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional 
Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi where the United States departed 
from its previous neutrality on sovereignty issues in the contested 
sea and declared a “national interest” in the sea and a “maritime 
commons,” challenging China’s claim to the entire SCS.3 
The following analysis examines China’s changing stance on 
sovereignty and concludes that Chinese assertiveness in the South 
China Sea is in fact a natural consequence of an unfortunate inter-
section between growing Chinese naval capacity and other states’ 
misunderstanding of China’s strategic outlook. The combination 
of these factors resulted in a security dilemma, but China has been 
held solely responsible for the resulting crisis. Eager to confirm the 
reality of an “aggressor China,” media reports and other commen-
tary have neglected to provide critical insights into China’s stra-
tegic behavior and the rationale behind its “assertiveness.” Instead, 
the tendency has been to ascribe China’s actions to the “maritime 
threat theory,” which claims that China’s naval forces are developing 
with the sole aim of “threaten[ing] U.S. security and interests” and 
must therefore be deterred.4 
This analysis first examines two alternative explanations for 
China’s changed posture—resource politics and nationalism—and 
argues why both have inadequately addressed the tensions behind 
the recent situation. It then shows that although China’s strategic 
view of the SCS and its broader goals of naval development helped 
fuel the security dilemma, China was by no means the sole perpe-
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trator of the breakdown in cooperation. It concludes by positing 
a function that may explain Chinese behavior in which, all other 
things being equal, enforcement or deterrence, credibly leveraged 
by growing naval capacity, is the response to provocation.
RESOURCE POLITICS,  AGAIN 
One argument explaining China’s growing assertiveness in 
the SCS concerns resource politics, which posits China’s need to 
meet energy demands as the primary driver behind the country’s 
recent aggressive behavior.  Ian Storey and Clive Schofield believe 
that China’s “insatiable demand for energy is an important driver of 
the [recent dispute]”5 and Bruce Stokes has observed that “Chinese 
analysts have dubbed the South China Sea the new Persian Gulf, 
and Beijing wants to solidify its dominion over potential oil and 
natural-gas reserves there.”6 China is attracted by the prospects of 
lessening its dependence on foreign imports of oil and gas, and as 
a result has acted abrasively in the SCS. As evidence of this no-
tion, proponents have cited the growing role of the China National 
Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOCC) in sea exploration and joint 
development agreements. Despite the popularity of this viewpoint, 
the resource politics explanation has several shortcomings in the 
context of the recent dispute.  
Beijing’s interest in the sea as a source of oil is not recent 
news. In fact, Beijing has long persisted in claiming that oil and gas 
deposits exist in large quantities and has provided generous esti-
mations of the resource potential of the sea.7 China estimates that 
34.97 billion tons of petroleum reserves remain to be drilled, in ad-
dition to the 1,182 billion tons of oil and 8,000 billion cubic mea-
sures of gas already discovered.8 Though the U.S. Department of 
Energy has declared that “there is little evidence outside of Chinese 
claims to support the view that the region contains substantial oil 
resources,”9 China maintains that these reserves exist and has com-
menced several exploration projects with various foreign compa-
nies from other claimant states and the United States. In 2006, for 
example, CNOOC partnered with the American company Husky 
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International to conduct explorations in the Spratly Islands in the 
South China Sea and claimed that four to six trillion cubic feet of 
natural gas reserves existed near the archipelago.10
Furthermore, though China is a major oil consumer, it also 
uses coal, natural gas, hydroelectric, and nuclear power to meet its 
energy needs.  Imported oil currently makes up only around 10 per-
cent of China’s overall energy usage,11 and the ratio of petroleum 
in China’s energy consumption structure is around 24 percent.12 
Coal, not oil, accounts for the majority of energy consumption at 
71 percent.13 Roughly 85 percent of China’s oil production capac-
ity is located onshore, while only 15 percent is located offshore.14 
Offshore oil may help to ease Chinese oil consumption demands, 
but it has yet to replace onshore production as the main source 
of crude oil production. As one Chinese scholar has suggested, 
“China, at least, is not focusing on the SCS for its future energy 
sources.”15
If resource politics is the issue, what explains China’s unusu-
ally cooperative behavior towards some of the claimant states in 
the period before relations deteriorated? Observers have noted that 
the escalation of tensions in the SCS has grown in tandem with 
increasing energy needs. But China is not alone in its hunger for 
resources; other claimants also view the sea as a resource prize. This 
view overlooks China’s position on joint development, which has 
been for the most part cooperative. In the early 1980s, Deng Xiaop-
ing called joint development “one of the…most important peaceful 
means for international dispute resolution.”16 Joint development 
was first proposed by Chinese premier Li Peng in 1990 when he 
“called upon claimants to set aside sovereignty to enable joint de-
velopment to proceed.”17 The 2003 and 2005 joint development 
programs with the Philippines and Vietnam are two occasions 
when China promoted this strategy to rein in sovereignty contests 
and further enhance its image as a cooperative regional actor. Thus, 
if resource politics induced a change in China’s posture, the argu-
ment must also explain why China has altered its stance concerning 
resource cooperation, despite accommodating and even initiating 
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joint development on several occasions in the past decade. *
NATIONALISM OVERUSED 
China’s assertiveness in the SCS has also been attributed to 
nationalism. Growing nationalistic sentiments in the party have 
placed pressure on the leadership to act assertively in order to re-
inforce legitimacy and project the image of a capable China. Al-
though this argument is often used retroactively to explain China’s 
foreign policies, it offers little authoritative analysis of the origins 
of the current tensions. Blumenthal cites author Christopher Ford, 
who argues that China’s bullying behavior in the South China Sea 
was a direct result of its “hardwired cultural conditioning”; Chinese 
leadership has been conditioned for “imperious behavior” and pos-
sesses “the mind of an empire.”18 Ott backs these sentiments, claim-
ing, “Powerful emotions are at work. China has become convinced 
that it is ready to replace the United States as the global power…
the Chinese let their pride get out of control.”19 
Observers examining the increased tensions between China, 
the other claimants, and the United States have been reactive to 
China’s actions in the SCS, interpreting China’s assertiveness to be 
the result of a rising tide in public nationalism. Yet, while national-
ism is inextricably linked to the escalation of tensions, it does not 
reflect China’s motivations for assertiveness in the SCS.  A useful 
case study is the 1995 Mischief Reef incident in the SCS, which at 
the time was a sore spot in Sino-Southeast Asian relations. China’s 
actions during that conflict led its neighbors to believe that it har-
bored a nationalist ambition to re-establish hegemonic power in 
the region.20 As Mark Valencia argued at the time, “China’s actions 
in the South China Sea are the result of a rising tide of national-
ism that seemed to be replacing socialism as the preferred societal 
* This topic is beyond the scope of this paper. For an overview of some examples of 
Chinese cooperation over fisheries management and joint oil and gas development, 
see David Rosenberg, “Fisheries management in the South China Sea,” 61-79, at 
70-72; Zou Keyuan “Cooperative development of oil and gas resources in the 
South China Sea” 80-92, at 85-87; Li Mingjiang, “China’s South China Sea dilemma: 
balancing sovereignty, development, and security,” 140-54, at 148-51.
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glue.”21 Likewise, Gerald Stegal stressed the point: “The Chinese 
regime copes with the internal consequences of reform by taking a 
tough stand on nationalist issues, hence Beijing’s active and vigor-
ous pursuit of claims in the South China Sea.”22 
Both the 1995 Mischief Reef incident and the subsequent 
flare-up of the same crisis in 1997 were eventually defused. No 
direct linkages were made between rising nationalism and the rea-
sons for China’s actions during that period; rather, nationalist rhet-
oric inflamed the debate after the crises came to light. In periods of 
controversy or high crisis, nationalistic sentiments were mobilized 
only to immediately evaporate when the crises subsided.  However, 
it seems possible that nationalism is an effect rather than a cause 
of aggression, crippling its persuasiveness as an explanation. In au-
thoritarian states like China, nationalism is a legitimating device. 
But in pursuit of legitimacy, did the regime “fan the fire” to stir up 
support for its actions in the SCS, or did nationalistic pressures 
force the regime to act aggressively in the SCS?  By extension, why 
did the regime stir up support for such actions, or contrarily, why 
did nationalists need to pressure the regime to act? The causality 
is unclear. The nationalism argument ultimately fails to explain 
China’s behavior. As Stenseth has argued, “The regime may use na-
tionalism to bolster legitimacy, which in turn can easily reflect back 
on the elite and force it to behave more aggressively than it would 
otherwise have done.”23 The role of nationalism in igniting the 
SCS dispute is at best ambiguous, though it is clear that once the 
dispute garnered attention in Chinese and Western media, nation-
alism naturally reinforced the intractability of the sovereignty ques-
tion and obscured its causes, as nationalist responses to tensions 
in the SCS might have come from either the public or the regime.
A FRAMEWORK
Given these unsatisfactory explanations, a more plau-
sible reason is needed for China’s behavior in the past two 
years, which has been noticeably different from the previous 
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period of cautious optimism. From 2002 to 2008,* China per-
sisted with its strategy of joint development as the principle 
dispute resolution strategy. However, in the past two years, 
China has grown increasingly unsure of the sustainability 
of such a strategy. Analysis demonstrates that its assertive 
rhetoric, matched with tangibly aggressive actions in the dis-
puted seas, were a response to a rapid change in the security 
environment brought on by the actions of the other claim-
ants. A convergence of factors contributed to China’s percep-
tion of a threat that, inter alia, included “arms modernization” 
in Southeast Asia, the internationalization of the dispute un-
der Vietnam’s ASEAN chairmanship, harassment of Chinese 
fishermen, and repeated violations of China’s maritime laws. 
Through the framework of a security dilemma, these were 
legitimate reasons for China to respond, but only if its navy 
or maritime forces had the capacity to do so effectively and 
credibly. 
Since the culmination of the dispute this past July at the ARF 
meeting, China has felt the ripple effect of its actions.  Storey and 
Schofield have claimed that “China’s behavior sets the tone of the 
dispute, and since 2007-2008, its behavior has become more asser-
tive.”24 With the focus on China’s reactive behavior, little attention 
has been given to China’s strategic perspective on the sea and its 
connection to national security interests, the role of the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in preserving those interests, and 
the combination of these three elements in guiding and justifying 
China’s actions in the SCS. These are important factors that must 
be examined in order to understand China’s seemingly irrational 
actions. Although this discussion inevitably gives rise to a “battle 
of perspectives,” it helps to inform the rationale behind China’s ac-
tions. 
*  I use this time period for the purposes of this analysis, using the 2002 Declaration 
on the Conduct of States in the SCS as the starting point and the 2008 completion 
of Hainan naval base as the ending point of China’s active pursuit of cooperation 
in the SCS. However, other analyses might note the period after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis as the beginning of the positive shift in relations between China 
and Southeast Asia.
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CHINESE  PERSPECTIVES ON NAVAL POWER, NATIONAL 
SECURITY,  AND THE SCS
 China is a geopolitically vulnerable country that for much 
of its history has faced real and imagined threats from both land 
and sea. During the Cold War, efforts were made to modernize 
China’s defenses, but naval development was delayed as a result of 
the government’s emphasis on modernizing a land force capable of 
deterring continental threats.25 The end of the Cold War brought 
changes to China’s traditional threat environment. With the excep-
tion of India and Bhutan,26 China resolved all outstanding land 
disputes along its terrestrial periphery.27 Therefore, in the 1990s, 
China refocused its attention on the sea—an area that it had been 
unable to effectively control during the Cold War. A common stra-
tegic view took shape, which predicted that “challenges to China’s 
territorial integrity and sovereignty [would] mostly come from the 
ocean, including the South China Sea.”28 To hedge against these 
threats, China focused its efforts on naval modernization.
Even before the force’s modernization in the 1990s, China 
maintained a fairly formidable maritime fleet relative to its neigh-
bors. However, this force, mainly comprised of World War II-era 
Russian naval craft, was fairly inexpensive and expendable.29 These 
weapons acquisitions were the products of naval developments be-
gun earlier during the 1970s and 80s when China was attempting 
to modernize its amphibious forces to respond to contingencies 
that could arise during a China-Taiwan conflict.30 Aside from Tai-
wan, the perception of coastal threats gave way to a strategy that 
linked China’s security with its interests in the Yellow Sea, the East 
and South China Seas, and the island chains that served as a “pe-
rimeter” separating Chinese claims from Japan and Russia.
Accelerated naval modernization came only after the tense 
Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996.31 During that incident, Chi-
na recognized that it did not have the naval capacity to deter the 
United States. The Strait Crisis thus set off a continuing effort to 
modernize China’s navy, which has encompassed a broad range of 
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weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles 
(ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), land-attack cruise 
missiles (LACMs), surface-to-air missiles, submarines, destroyers, 
patrol craft, and amphibious ships.32  Rapid naval modernization 
reflects the government’s focus on maritime security, which has 
been given equal or greater priority compared to continental se-
curity. 
China’s rapid naval modernization program is undeniably 
the result of the navy’s growing strategic importance. According 
to then-Director of the PLA’s General Equipment Department, 
General Cao Gangchuan, “The [PLAN] shoulders the important 
mission of safeguarding the security of the territorial sea and is 
placed at the forefront of military [engagements].”33 Former USN 
Naval Attaché to China Brad Kaplan agrees: “Such support by se-
nior PLA leadership has resulted in the PLAN being allocated a 
higher proportion of the defense budget in recent years, allowing 
it to pursue force modernization aggressively.”34 The real strategic 
shift, however, came in a December 2006 senior navy officers’ meet-
ing where Chairman Hu Jintao declared China a maritime power 
and called on the PLAN to develop a powerful People’s Navy that 
would “adapt to its historical mission during a new century and 
a new period.”35 The PLA newspaper Jiefangjun Bao published 
a piece which extolled China’s status as a self-declared maritime 
power.36 These views seem to corroborate the perception that 
PLAN’s maritime mission had evolved from “static coastal defense” 
to “active offshore defense”37 and that the enforcement of national 
interests relied on the accelerated development of a modern force 
capable of asserting China’s interests in the “deep seas.”38 
How does one make sense of China’s aims regarding the rapid 
modernization of its maritime and naval capabilities? One common 
view holds that China’s naval modernization is meant to challenge 
the American presence in the region and that the PLAN will con-
tinue to act as an anti-access force that could deter U.S. interven-
tion in any potential dispute with Taiwan.39 Although China may 
be enhancing its naval capacity to safeguard its territorial claims 
from other claimants and to ensure maritime rights against what 
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it sees as an overbearing U.S. presence near waters it claims as its 
own,* these factors do not necessarily make China unreasonably 
aggressive. Realists would endorse China’s attitude towards na-
tional security because Beijing’s perception of threat, which often 
includes U.S. naval presence during tense periods, is important to 
its strategic calculations and greatly influences the pace of China’s 
military modernization programs. 
Scrutinizing its actions through a prism other than security, 
China’s motivations for naval modernization are varied. Ralf Em-
mers has argued that “the Chinese military build-up in the South 
China Sea goes beyond avoiding, by force if necessary, any viola-
tions of its sovereign rights in the disputed areas. Other factors that 
drive the Chinese naval build-up include guaranteeing China’s mar-
itime security…economic prosperity and energy supplies.”40 In the 
Chinese strategic view, the sea has always been important for pur-
poses beyond naval defense, even if it remains the most important 
consideration.† Increasingly, China needs the ability to respond to 
issues that threaten coastal security such as piracy, resource exploi-
tation, and territorial claims. The navy aside, other maritime fleets 
like the coastguard and fisheries patrol‡ help respond to emergen-
cies and enforce China’s maritime laws. 
 Naval modernization has its benign elements. A Congres-
sional Research Service report found that China’s pursuit of naval 
modernization serves a range of goals, including the ability to regu-
late foreign military activities in its 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ), protect its sea lines of communication, and enhance 
*  See, for example, the view of an “aggressor” China (rising in tandem with growing 
naval capacity): Abraham Denmark, “China’s Navy Gets its Act Together, and 
Aggressive,” Center for New American Security, April 26, 2010.
†  Mao Zedong in 1952 declared “we must build a powerful navy against aggression by 
imperialism.” 
‡  Bonnie Glaser. Personal Interview. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
Washington, DC: October 21, 2010. For example, the South China Fishery Administration 
dispatches ships to “protect China’s national maritime interests and safeguard Chinese 
fishing fleets’ safety. [Other goals include] standardizing fishing activities, strengthen 
conservation efforts, and provide Chinese fishing fleets with rescue services.” [Wang Tong 
and Youwei Suo, “To Fight Piracy and Protect Fishing Fleets, Spratly Islands Patrol Flotilla 
of Chinese Fishery Administration Left Sanya.” Zhongguo Xinwen She, April 6, 2010].
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its prestige on a global scale.41 Even the U.S. Department of De-
fense noted in their report to Congress that, apart from “challeng-
ing” the United States, the Chinese navy has demonstrated the ca-
pability to conduct limited deployments to support counter-piracy 
operations, and has acquired new classes of ships to support hu-
manitarian and disaster relief missions.42 
Aside from such humanitarian missions, strategic calcula-
tions for force modernization also involve strategies to sustain Chi-
na’s long-term role as a “maritime power.” The Defense Department 
report states that “in response to the 2004 articulation of the PLA’s 
‘New Historic Missions,’ China’s senior military leaders began de-
veloping concepts for an expanded regional maritime strategy and 
presence … PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli called for a ‘pow-
erful navy to protect fishing, resource development and strategic 
passageways for energy.’”43 The report further notes that “many of 
[Wu Shengli’s] ideas echo the debates in the late 1980s and early 
1990s over building PLA naval capabilities. However, the rise of 
Taiwan contingency planning as the dominant driver of PLA force 
modernization … largely sidelined these discussions.”44 
These observations imply that concern over China’s naval 
modernization has generally focused on the “aggressiveness” of the 
modernization effort, but China’s naval development aims also in-
clude objectives unrelated to deterrence capacity against the United 
States in a dispute with Taiwan. For example, in their response to 
Ross’s assertion that China’s more aggressive naval development is 
connected to its decision to develop a “carrier-centered navy” with 
the wherewithal to challenge the U.S. Navy, Saunders and Glosny 
argue that the PLAN is “much more likely to develop a limited 
power-projection capability that increases China’s ability to defend 
regional interests in contingencies not involving the United States, 
to protect expanding overseas interests, to perform nontraditional 
missions, to conduct military diplomacy, to demonstrate interna-
tional responsibility, and to increase China’s prestige.”45 Their ar-
gument underscores the fact that though China is undeniably in-
terested in balancing the American naval presence in the region, 
China is also developing its navy for many other purposes that do 
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not involve confronting the United States, and in areas that do not 
explicitly challenge the 7th Fleet of the U.S. Navy. 
The South China Sea is uniquely important to China as a nat-
ural shield for security in the south. Stability in this region is criti-
cal for China’s national security because an undisturbed periphery 
is a precondition for peaceful development. 46 Ever cognizant of the 
need to achieve this goal, Beijing clashes with the other claimants in 
order to increase its control over the “near seas.”47 The occupation 
status of the claimant countries illustrates the significance of con-
trol. Though China may be the strongest of the claimant states, it is 
Vietnam that occupies most of the land features in the SCS. This 
struggle for control has roots in the history of SCS tensions that 
characterized Sino-Southeast relations until 2002. China twenty 
years ago was in no position to enforce its claims to the sea. While 
it has been argued that China’s show of military force during the 
1974 and 1988 clashes with Vietnam over the Paracel and Spratly 
Islands in the SCS clearly indicated its enforcement ability, those 
cases reflect Chinese opportunism more than assertions of power. 
In 1974, capitalizing on the imminent collapse of South Vietnam 
and the unlikelihood of U.S. intervention, China seized the Paracel 
Islands from Vietnam. The brief naval clash was an “uncomplicated 
military maneuver that did not require deploying significant naval 
forces, which China did not then possess.”48 China acted because 
of low opportunity costs, and not necessarily the ability to project 
sustained naval power. The post-Cold War threat environment led 
China to enhance its navy’s power projection capabilities, acquire 
new and advanced weapons systems, and modernize its South 
Sea Fleet (SSF).49 Of the three fleets under the command of the 
PLAN, the SSF was the weakest in the 1970s, but it now rivals and 
perhaps surpasses the North and East Sea Fleets.50
 Chinese claims to the sea encompass four different perspec-
tives, all equally valid in the Chinese legal sense, which inform Chi-
na’s rationale for assertiveness. First, China has always viewed the 
South China Sea, one of its “near seas,” as “a region of core geostra-
tegic interest and part of a great defensive perimeter established on 
land and at sea to protect China’s major population and economic 
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centers along the coast.”51 But the nature of China’s claim over the 
waters, islands, shoals, and rocks found within the 1947 U-shaped 
territorial boundary has never been clarified,52 leading to several 
different and at times, politically convenient interpretations. 
According to Peter Dutton, the U-shaped line may be inter-
preted as denoting China’s sovereign waters, and is subject to the 
government’s jurisdiction. If this were the case, the waters would be 
seen as China’s territorial seas. Under the 1982 UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), this designation has several 
strategic implications for claimant states, the most important be-
ing that the term “territorial” gives China complete jurisdiction over 
those waters. As identified by Dutton, this view helped inform the 
passing of the 1992 Law of the PRC on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, which essentially claims all the island groups in 
the South China Sea and promotes the U-shape line as a “zone of 
sovereignty.”53 Thus, this law gives Beijing the right to use force to 
protect the islands.*
Another interpretation of the 1947 line claims the sea as his-
toric waters, premising China’s claim on historic rights. Chinese 
law incorporated historic rights in the 1998 Law of the PRC on 
the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf, and has used 
historic rights to argue for “administrative responsibilities” over 
the islands.54 This argument has helped justify Chinese claims to 
broad jurisdictional authority over the islands in the SCS, and in 
combination with China’s “sovereign waters” perspective, it explains 
China’s rationale “for increased activities in the sea by the vessels 
of China’s Maritime Surveillance Service, Fisheries Service, Coast 
Guard, and others.”55
A third view argues that the line simply claims the land fea-
tures† that are found within those waters. However, this implies 
that UNCLOS allows coastal states to claim sovereignty over 
the land features and the adjacent waters surrounding those land 
features. Since China claims all of the land features within the U-
*  See Article 14 of the Law, which states that the PRC has the right to exercise “hot 
pursuit” when foreign vessels enters the PRC’s waters.
†  Land features, inter alia, include islands, rocks, sand bars, and coral heads.
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shaped line, it has also argued for its right to the entire sea sur-
rounding those features.* This perspective contributed to China’s 
decision to pass the 1992 and 1998 laws, which first claimed is-
land groups in the SCS and then claim the accompanying territo-
rial seas, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelf associated 
with those land features.56 
One final perspective contends that China’s assertiveness 
about its claims in the waters of its near seas has grown in tan-
dem with the size of its navy and maritime services. Therefore, “the 
U-shaped line reflects China’s long-standing maritime security in-
terests in the South China Sea, and they should have legal protec-
tion.”57 The view suggests that China’s maritime security interests 
are closely linked with the boundaries of the U-shaped line, and 
threats posed by other claimants to these security interests would 
result in a show of force, contingent on a capable maritime force 
credibly asserting control. The four perspectives provide critical 
insights into the Chinese strategic and legal perspective on the dis-
puted sea, and explain in some detail how China’s “law-based” view 
of the sea has led it to promulgate laws that guide and justify its 
aggressive actions in situations where those laws are violated.
The role of the Chinese navy in assuring China’s national 
security and defining the threat environment helps to eluci-
date China’s understanding of its claims to the disputed sea, 
and its motivations in forcefully asserting its claim. Naval de-
velopment, prioritized under the national security strategy, 
has affected China’s position in the South China Sea. It makes 
China more confident in its ability to deter other claimants 
from violating Chinese maritime laws concerning the dis-
puted sea. Over the past two years, China’s naval and mari-
time forces have played a role in this dispute by carrying out 
activities such as arrests, patrols, and fines, which align with 
the national interest. But with force projection secured, what 
of the catalysts that moved China to respond to other SCS 
*  This interpretation is contrary to existing international definitions of what 
constitutes an island, but for the purposes of this paper, I examine the Chinese 
view of these claims. 
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claimants? The following analysis turns to the roles of those 
states whom the Chinese have dubbed the “true provoca-
teurs” in the dispute.* 
PROVOCATEUR OR VICTIM? – THE SECURITY DILEMMA IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Emmers argued, “Beijing is not solely responsible for the rise 
in tension in the South China Sea.”58 Likewise, Storey and Scho-
field have admitted that “the activities of other claimants have led 
China to pursue a more hard-line policy [in the SCS].”59 Having 
examined the Chinese strategic view of the SCS and its relation-
ship to broader goals in naval development, this analysis now turns 
to the more controversial question behind the dispute: what caused 
China to act in a manner that elicited worldwide criticism? Under-
lying this analysis is the classic security dilemma, in which dispu-
tant states acting rationally in their own interests misperceive each 
other’s intentions and collectively produce a suboptimal outcome.
Chinese sources point to several actions undertaken by the 
Southeast Asian claimants that intensified the security dilemma to 
the point of “forcing” China’s hand. President of the National In-
stitute for South China Sea Studies Wu Shicun has claimed, “The 
direct cause to the Nansha [South China Sea] dispute is the en-
croachment of the four countries Vietnam, the Philippines, Malay-
sia, and Brunei on the rights and interests of China’s Nansha Sea 
areas. [C]laimant countries concerned in the Nansha dispute and 
seeking to capture sea areas by ‘force’ have triggered an arms race.”60 
What were these “encroachments”? 
 As even some Western scholars have suggested, the first 
“provocation” to trigger an “aggressive” response from China resulted 
from tensions over the Philippines’ 2009 Baselines Law. However, 
*  Many online commentators have argued that the provocations have become unbearable 
to the extent that China’s problem is no longer Taiwan, but Vietnam. Though questionable 
in their objectivity, they offer a  glimpse into what some Chinese believe regarding the 
present dispute. See “Courageous attack: China’s objective is not Taiwan but Vietnam and 
the Nansha Sea” (大胆进攻：中国目标不是台湾而是越南是南海), http://www.1n0.
net/Article/jqcb/77061.html. 
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Emmers notes that China was already incensed by the Philippine 
Parliament’s decision to pass the 2007 Maritime Boundary Act, 
which incorporated parts of the disputed Spratly Islands into Phil-
ippine territory. Fueling the fire, the Philippine military announced 
in 2008 it would repair and lengthen the airstrip at Kalayaan Is-
land, the largest island occupied by the Philippines, and upgrade 
troop quarters.61 Thus, when the Philippines passed the Baselines 
Law in 2009, which essentially claimed sovereignty over the con-
tested Huangyan and some reefs and islands in the Spratly Islands, 
China’s embassy in Manila lodged a complaint and vehemently 
criticized the law. China “made strenuous attempts to dissuade the 
Philippines from enacting [the 2009 law] but was ultimately un-
successful.”62 As a result, Chinese naval analysts predicted China 
would seek to safeguard the country’s maritime rights and inter-
ests by speeding up the demarcation of China’s territorial waters, 
tightening administrative control of the islands, and intensifying 
naval readiness by adding training on operating weaponry.63 This 
response elicited regional concern that China was taking a notably 
“aggressive” stance in the dispute. 
 A second “trigger,” according to Sam Bateman, was Malaysia 
and Vietnam’s joint submission in May 2009 to the United Nations 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).64 
The submission, which followed the Philippines Baselines Law, 
was regarded as highly provocative because it not only claimed the 
entire southern part of the contested seas but also internationalized 
the dispute, 65 challenging China’s attempts to keep the conflict on 
a bilateral level. China’s response was to submit a protest note that 
included the uninterrupted U-shaped line map, therefore “reviving 
old suspicions in Hanoi, Kuala Lumpur and Manila.”66 To show its 
displeasure, Beijing also established a new Department of Bound-
ary and Ocean Affairs and “enhanced patrolling capabilities in an 
attempt to further assert its sovereignty.”67 As Bateman notes, Ma-
laysia and Vietnam’s persistence in keeping the submission on the 
table despite China’s protestations “[was] seen as a political gesture 
that only served to inflame the situation.”68 
 A third factor of China’s aggressive actions in the SCS was 
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Vietnam. As ASEAN Chair for 2010, Vietnam was well positioned 
to accord the SCS dispute a high priority on the ASEAN agenda.* 
According to one Chinese commentary in the daily newspaper of 
the CPC Central Committee Renmin Ribao, Vietnam’s persistence 
in internationalizing the issue was like “playing with fire,” and it 
warned that Vietnam needed to “constructively respond to China’s 
consistent good-neighbor policy on its periphery.”69 Indeed, from 
China’s perspective, Vietnam had been opportunistic, denying Chi-
na’s attempts to be a good neighbor and encouraging members to 
unite against China. Vietnam’s success was evident during the ARF 
meeting when, in an unprecedented move, twelve of the 27 ARF 
members voiced support for Clinton’s demand that China respect 
the maritime commons.70 Both Glaser and Ott argue that China 
was surprised and shocked by the show of unity and consensus that 
had grown around this issue, further provoking China to continue 
its sea strategy of arrests and patrols.71 As Glaser has also suggest-
ed, Clinton had been prepared to make such a statement only with 
the backing of others in the region.  The Chinese media interpreted 
this cooperation as an attempt by the United States and Vietnam 
to drive a wedge between China and the other claimants.
 Aside from the actions criticized by China, other incidents 
have also exacerbated the security dilemma. The PRC-owned press 
agency Zhongguo Tongxun She reported that “in addition to deal-
ing with the SCS issue by political and diplomatic means, Viet-
nam, the Philippines, and Malaysia have repeatedly taken military 
actions…to capture ‘sea areas’ by force.”72 Predicting the tensions 
that would come in 2010, another Chinese analyst pointed out in 
2009 that “the navies of countries in the South China Sea areas 
have developed very rapidly in recent years…The weapons that 
*  For examples of “internationalization” of the issue, see speeches from Secretary Gates 
at the Shangri-La Dialogue 2010 (IISS) and Secretary Clinton’s remarks at the ARF 
2010 forum. Robert Sutter in a Comparative Connections Report also claimed that 
“Vietnamese officials visiting Washington were unusually direct in complaining about 
what they depicted as escalating Chinese military actions in the area and seeking support 
from [Washington].” [Senior Officials Visit; South China Sea Tensions.” Comparative 
Connections 12 (2): 69-76.] Also see Richard Weitz in “Why US made Hanoi Move” who 
claims that the US was “under pressure” from ASEAN countries to step up over the South 
China Sea [The Diplomat, August 18, 2010]. 
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the [non-Chinese claimants] have purchased…includes U.S.-built 
Hornets and the Russian-built MIG-29s and Su-27s. We cannot 
afford to be optimistic over the situation in the South China Sea. 
While China will neither take part in [an] arms race nor threaten 
other countries with force, China must consider its own security.”73 
The sentiment echoed Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s remarks in a 
statement refuting the media fallacies over China’s position on the 
SCS. In a response to China’s aggressive patrols, Yang stated that 
“China, being a big country, also has its legitimate concerns. Is this 
expression of one’s legitimate concerns coercion? That is not logi-
cal.”74 In the framework of the security dilemma, China reacted to 
something that may not have been a tangible threat, but was cer-
tainly perceived as such.* 
Besides the perceptible arms buildup, China also considered 
skirmishes between fishermen and patrol boats in the SCS to be 
“illegal activities”75 on its waters and responded accordingly under 
the provisions of its maritime laws. The literature has pointed to 
Vietnam, but other claimants also played a role in the tensions. In 
June 2009, China protested Indonesia’s arrest of seventy-five Chi-
nese fishermen who were accused of fishing illegally in Indonesia’s 
EEZ.76 This past June, Chinese fishermen were arrested and their 
fishing boats detained by both Philippine and Indonesian authori-
ties on charges of illegal fishing.77 According to an IISS report,78 
another serious incident came in March 2010 when Chinese fish-
ing trawlers reported that the Vietnamese coastguard was harass-
ing them, and it was only when the Vietnamese heard that a Chi-
nese flotilla of six ships from the North Fleet was headed towards 
the SCS that they dispersed.79As the IISS report suggests, the 
Chinese flotilla was sent as a warning to the Vietnamese.80 
*  The traditional argument that China is the biggest actor in the region and most 
militarily powerful, so it feels less constrained to act within the realm of established 
law. 
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ENFORCEMENT: A FUNCTION OF PROVOCATION AND 
CAPACITY
This analysis, premised on the assumption that states are ra-
tional actors operating under a security dilemma, asserts that the 
security dilemma has been a significant cause of China’s aggressive 
behavior. This assertion relies on two analyses, the first establishing 
the framework for China’s strategy regarding naval development 
and the second detailing provocations that may have led China to 
act assertively on the sea. Combining both analyses yields a simple 
function that describes China’s muscular behavior. Enforcement re-
sponse is the function of the level of provocation and capacity. The 
first analysis suggested that when China’s naval capacity increases, 
its enforcement capacity grows as well.  If provocations persist, 
China feels obligated to defend and assert itself, but only with suffi-
cient naval capacity. When combined into a function stripped of its 
spatial and temporal elements, these two analyses provide a critical 
insight: regardless of the situation in the South China Sea, China’s 
view of its naval power, coastal defense obligations, and claims to 
other disputed seas remain essentially the same. The U.S. naval 
presence, Taiwan, and the Yellow or the East China Seas also pres-
ent potential threats to China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
In light of China’s broader strategic goals and its security dilemma-
induced environment, it may be asserted that China’s naval mod-
ernization, while condemned by both the United States and the 
other claimants, will proceed irrespective of any disputes over the 
SCS. Admittedly, the naval build-up has formed and intensified 
one dimension of the security dilemma, provoking strong reactions 
from the non-Chinese claimants. But this has led to increased em-
phasis on China’s assertiveness as indication of its recalcitrance, 
and distorted to some degree the cause of this dispute: a spillover 
in the security dilemma. 
Together, the two previous analyses make it clear that al-
though Beijing may still be regarded as a perpetrator, it is not the 
only perpetrator, despite portrayals of a rogue China that has fi-
nally “risen” and now must be deterred. Indeed, while attempts have 
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been made to depict China as a regional bully, it would be unfair 
to ignore the fact that China was responding to what it saw as an 
imbalance in the status quo, in which the other claimants engaged 
in threatening activities. As one commentator notes, Beijing’s posi-
tion on the SCS prior to the recent flare-up had been one of pained 
flexibility: 
Beijing may not be happy about the fact that it still has the 
smaller presence in the South China Sea and that it has not 
been able to dictate recent developments on the South China 
Sea. Instead, Beijing has often found itself on the defensive. Chi-
na has scrupulously accepted those declaratory, moral, political, 
and even legal commitments on the premise that those commit-
ments should not fundamentally challenge the bottom line of 




Though responsibility for the SCS tensions remains dis-
puted, it is clear that tensions have escalated in the past two 
years, and the list of confrontations continues to point to Chi-
na—the biggest, strongest, and most vocal of the claimant 
countries—as the aggressor. An examination of the dispute 
dynamic shows that an unfortunate security dilemma has 
arisen as a result of misperceptions of Chinese naval capac-
ity, goals, and strategic outlook. For their part, the Southeast 
Asian claimants have had similar experiences, and their own 
motivations and rationales for action deserve attention as 
well. However, in seeking to understand the other claimants’ 
perspectives it is helpful to elucidate the problems of a secu-
rity dilemma in the context of China’s position. 
This analysis surely has its own shortcomings, and leaves 
unanswered several issues for future research. It has not devoted 
sufficient attention to the role of the United States, instead empha-
sizing China’s strategic view and its perspectives on provocation. 
Future research might consider to what degree the United States 
has influenced tensions, as it only recently articulated its position 
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on the status of the sea as “a maritime commons.” One other cri-
tique of this analysis will inevitably be the appearance of lenience 
in its interpretation of the Chinese view of the sea and of its naval 
capacity. China’s claim that its four legal perspectives legitimize its 
sovereign contests is easily countered by contrasting interpreta-
tions from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Which 
interpretation is superior? While the use of these perspectives to 
defend China’s actions fuels a conflict over semantics, law, and his-
torical interpretation, the introduction of these four perspectives 
helps to establish a rationale for Chinese action, and need not pre-
clude the basis of any other claim. This analysis has sought to show 
that China’s motivations are underscored by four interpretations 
that help to explain the legitimacy of its actions. Observers are not 
privy to Chinese leadership decisions, but it is reasonable to as-
sume that in the world of rational players, distorted by a security 
dilemma, reasons to act aggressively—often justified by domestic 
law and corroborated by existing international law*—help, ironi-
cally, to frame rational choice.
Despite its shortcomings, the present analysis does 
clarify the complex issue of perception, its relationship to the 
security dilemma, and its potential to distort the dynamic 
and variable dimensions of the dispute. At the time of this 
writing, China and the involved member states of ASEAN 
have begun a dialogue to establish a legally binding code of 
conduct. The prospects for success of such an endeavor may 
depend on the legacy of past actions. Regardless, China will 
continue to face a dilemma of its own creation. Though it has 
begun a process of damage control with its southern neigh-
bors, it would weaken its position by admitting to being the 
perpetrator of conflict or by seeking any accord that under-
mines its claims. The outcome of the drama in the South Chi-
na Sea remains uncertain. It seems that for China, no matter 
the maneuver, being perceived as a “good neighbor” has not 
*  For example, China subscribes to the UNCLOS as legitimizing its claim (historical, 
sovereign, etc), although the premise of its claim has ironically been questioned 
by UNCLOS.
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been enough.
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